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THE ANTITRUST STANDARD FOR UNLAWFUL
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
Herbert Hovenkamp *
This essay gives a very general definition of unlawful
exclusionary conduct under '2 of the Sherman Act, considers some
alternatives, and then explains what is and is not involved in
assessing conduct under the given definition.
General definition of anticompetitive exclusion
We define monopolistic conduct as acts that:
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or
prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of
rivals; and
(2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for
them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting
benefits.
In addition, the practice must be reasonably susceptible to
judicial control, which means that the court must be able to identify
the conduct as anticompetitive and either fashion an appropriate
deterrent or an equitable remedy likely to improve competition. 1
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor or Law, University of Iowa College of

Law.
1

See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the
Dominant Firm, in Conservative Economic Influences on U.S. Antitrust Policy
(Robert Pitofsky, ed., Oxford University Press, 2008); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 Univ. Chicago L.Rev. 147 (2005). In Microsoft
the D.C. Circuit defined a test of equivalent generality, although in considerably
more detail, and including allocation of proof burdens:
First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an
"anticompetitive effect." That is, it must harm the competitive process and
thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will
not suffice.
Second, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests, ... must
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Clause (1) of the test ensures that the conduct is both
exclusionary and "substantial," in the sense that it is reasonably
capable of creating or prolonging monopoly. Clause (2a) deals with
the easiest case for identifying anticompetitive exclusion; namely
where no consumer benefit whatsoever can be shown. Clause (2b)
deals with situations where a less restrictive alternative might
produce equivalent benefits, and clause number (2c) deals with the
small number of situations thought to require some kind of balancing
of harms and gains. For example, in a reasonably close predatory
pricing case one may have to determine whether monopoly pricing
during a post-predation "recoupment" period are sufficient to offset
any short run benefits that accrue to consumers during a period of
very low prices. 2
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite
anticompetitive effect.... [I]n a case brought by the Government, it must
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not just a
competitor.
Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under ' 2 by
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a
"procompetitive justification" for its conduct.... If the monopolist asserts a
procompetitive justification--a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is
indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal--then the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim....
Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands unrebutted,
then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the
conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit....
Finally, in considering whether the monopolist's conduct on balance harms
competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for purposes of '
2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind
it. Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant
only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the
monopolist's conduct.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 952 (2001) (to the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by the United
States and some state AGs). See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law &617 (3d ed. 2008).
2

See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993) (assessing these requirements); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007) (reiterating them in a case
involving allegedly predatory buying). .
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Alternative definitions
The given definition of monopolistic conduct is very general, in
the sense that it does not provide precise tests for specific practices,
such as improper patent infringement suits 3 or predatory pricing. 4
We leave those essential details for later. Numerous definitions of
exclusionary conduct have been proposed that are more focused or
more technical than our stated definition. Many of these are more
useful for analyzing specific exclusionary practices than our own
general definition. However, these definitions are also "incomplete,"
in the sense that they do not account for every type of exclusionary
conduct that the law of monopolization should condemn.
Further, alternative tests for monopolization are not merely
technically different. Some of them reflect judgments quite different
than ours about when conduct by a monopolist should be regarded
as unlawfully exclusionary, or different judgments about the ability of
antitrust tribunals to detect and remedy exclusionary conduct.
We begin, however, by examining the broadest criteria for
identifying anticompetitive conduct -- namely, "total welfare" and
"consumer welfare" tests.
"Welfare" tests for monopolization -- "total welfare" and "consumer
welfare"
In economics a welfare test purports to measure how well off
people are, perhaps as a result of a particular practice. Such welfare
tests typically use "willingness to pay" as a welfare criterion. The
"purest" welfare definition in neoclassical economics is the Pareto
test, which declares that a state of affairs is efficient if no further
movement exists that could benefit at least one person without also
injuring someone else. Because virtually all legal policies produce
both gainers and losers pure Paretianism is much too strict a
standard for evaluating legal policy. Rather, economists sometimes
use a variation called "potential Pareto efficiency," or Kaldor-Hicks

3

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.

4

See Ch. 7C.

4
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efficiency, 5 which states that an economic change is efficient if those
who gain from the change gain enough so that they can fully
compensate any losers.
Under this test, which is the basis of modern cost-benefit
analysis, a practice is efficient, or welfare increasing, if the sum of all
gains, measured in some constant unit of value, exceeds the sum of
all losses. For example, a market movement from competition to
monopoly harms welfare in this sense: although the monopolist
gains, its gains are less than consumers lose. 6 It can be shown
mathematically that perfect competition in a perfectly functioning
market maximizes Welfare in the Pareto sense. 7 Such a market is
also Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Since competitive markets are the goal of antitrust, one is
tempted to say that the proper definition of an unlawful exclusionary
practice is one that reduces welfare, which should be the same as
making the market less competitive. Robert Bork argued in 1978
that the proper test for antitrust practices is something which he
called "consumer welfare," but by which he really meant "total
welfare," or the sum of the welfare of all affected persons, including
both consumers and producers. 8
There are good reasons, grounded in both policy and
5

See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ.J. 545 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696 (1939).
6

In the standard illustration of monopoly the monopolist's gain in higher
prices is precisely offset by the consumer's loss from the same higher prices.
However, there is also a "deadweight" loss consisting of unmade sales that do not
profit the monopolist, and that harm consumers by forcing inferior choices.
Because the deadweight loss triangle is a loss to consumers too, aggregate
consumer losses exceed the monopolist's gains. See 2B Phillip E. Areeda &
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &403 (3d ed. 2007); and Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice ''1.2a, 2.3c (3d
ed. 2005).
7

This is the First Welfare Theorem. See Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard
Debreu, The Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
Econometrica 265 (1954).
8

See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 90, 107-115 (1978) (consumer
welfare is "merely another term for the wealth of the nation").
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administration, why total welfare in this sense is not a useful antitrust
test. First, while any move from monopoly to competition may be
thought to increase welfare, this begs the question when we are
looking for a legal test. Surely an antitrust tribunal cannot measure
and trade off all of the gains and losses that result from any specific
practice except in the easiest and most unambiguous cases.
Antitrust policy requires workable tests for making judgments about
competitive effects. Further, these tests must be reasonably
administrable by the courts.
That is not to say that the concept of welfare is useless to
antitrust analysis. A practice that benefits consumers while doing no
harm to producers, or that harms consumers greatly while producing
only small benefits to producers can readily be identified as
competitive or anticompetitive with little analysis. But in most
reasonably close cases ambiguities and tradeoffs make serious
netting of gains and losses impossible.
Another objection to total welfare tests is that they are
indifferent as between consumer and producer gains. A practice that
results in significantly higher prices to consumers would be lawful
under a total welfare test if the gains that accrued to the monopolist
(or cartel) were slightly greater than the losses suffered by
consumers and no one else was affected. 9 But the broadest
constituency in our economy is consumers and the strong direction
of antitrust policy has been to weigh consumer welfare higher than
producer welfare, although perhaps this point should not be pushed
too far. 10 While this political objection seems weighty when applied
to joint ventures or mergers, observable transactions that we tolerate
because they benefit certain constituencies, it does seem less
weighty when applied to the unilateral conduct of a monopolist.
An alternative to total welfare tests is the so-called "consumer
9

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1 (1982). Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, note 6, '2.3c.
10

Historically, while consumers represent the broadest interest group in the
economy producer groups have been much more effective lobbyists. Many
statutory rules, including the antitrust laws, are best explained as favoring the
special interests of politically powerful or clever producer groups. On this point,
see Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy note 6, '2.1; Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Ch. 2 (2006).

6
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welfare" principle, which declares that antitrust practices should be
evaluated by considering the impact on consumers, largely ignoring
effects on producers or others. 11 Under this test a practice that
imposes consumer losses would be unlawful, even if it provided
greater gains to the monopolist than the losses consumers
encountered.
Such a test for monopolistic practices seems both
overdeterrent and underdeterrent. First, it would condemn practices
that are not capable of excluding anyone. Suppose that Microsoft,
which has a monopoly in its Windows operating system, should
develop a new version that was particularly buggy and prone to
crashes. Clearly, consumers as a group would be harmed because
they have few good alternatives to Windows. But developing a bad
version of Windows is not a monopolistic practice because no one is
excluded. Microsoft's mistake might permit other firms to come in
and steal sales, or it might simply impose harm on consumers until
Microsoft fixed the problems and restored the status quo, but the one
thing that the practice would clearly not do is exclude rivals from the
market. As a result, the practice is not "monopolistic," even though it
causes consumer harm.
One might say that this is merely a technical objection. The
real intent of a consumer welfare test is to identify practices that both
exclude rivals from the market and harm consumers. But in that
case the test is underdeterrent because antitrust must be able to
identify and condemn harmful practices long before actual consumer
11

See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, presented to
the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/public_studies_fr28902/exclus_conduct_
pdf/051104_Salop_Mergers.pdf.
See also Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73
Antitrust L.J. 483, 518 (2006) (advocating a modified general welfare test that is
solicitous of consumer welfare:
antitrust enforcers and courts should seek to maximize aggregate surplus,
so long as consumers and producers sufficiently share the efficiency
gains, at least on average....
And see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers Should Guide Antitrust, 58
Antitrust L.J. 631 (1988).

Hovenkamp, EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

7

harm has occurred. Consider the monopolist who files a wrongful
patent infringement suit in order to maintain its monopoly. 12 Such a
lawsuit must be addressed by antitrust tribunals long before any
consumer harm has resulted. Indeed, under existing rules such
claims are treated as compulsory counterclaims, which means that
they must be evaluated at the same time as the monopolist's
infringement action itself is evaluated. 13
Here again, one might say that the consumer welfare
standard works because even though no actual consumer harm
results, such harm is in prospect: it will occur if the monopolist
succeeds in its infringement action. But in that case we are not
measuring anything at all. Rather, we are observing that no principle
of patent policy protects fraudulently obtained patents, so there is
nothing to place on the monopolist's side of the ledger. Consumer
harm may or may not occur, depending on the fortunes of the small
firm who is saved from market exclusion by antitrust intervention. As
a result, we are dealing with a case in which an action excludes a
rival without any consumer benefit. 14 Measurement of consumer
harm is not necessary to condemnation.
To be sure, there is an important sense in which consumer
harm is essential to our analysis of antitrust practices. Antitrust
should not be in the business of condemning conduct that does not
harm consumers. But the measurement of consumer harm cannot
serve as the basis for considering whether conduct violates '2 of the
Sherman Act.
The remaining proposed tests discussed here are all designed
to simplify '2 analysis by avoiding some of the measurement
difficulties that "welfare" tests incur.
"Sacrifice"
In Aspen the Supreme Court condemned conduct when the
defendant
12

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.

13

See 3 Antitrust Law &706e.

14

See part 2A of our test for monopolization, text at note 1.
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was not motivated by efficiency concerns and ... was willing to
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller
rival. 15

So-called "sacrifice" tests for exclusionary conduct look at the
defendant's willingness to sacrifice short-term revenues or profits in
exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materialize later when a
monopoly has been created or the dominant firm's position
strengthened. The strongest example of such a test is the
recoupment test for predatory pricing given in the Brooke Group
case, although it appeared in lower court opinions and the academic
literature much earlier. 16
The sacrifice test is also useful in unilateral refusal to deal
cases to the extent that, if we wish to condemn refusals to deal at all,
we must have a mechanism for identifying the very small subset of
refusals that are anticompetitive. 17 In Trinko the government relied
on a sacrifice theory in arguing that the alleged refusal to deal did not

15

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610611 (1985).
16

Brooke Group, note 2; A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d
1396, 1400-1401 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) (advocating
recoupment test).
See also Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697, 698
(1975):
"... the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the
market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the
absence of competition.")
See also the first edition of Antitrust Law: Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F.
Turner, Antitrust Law &711b at 151 (1978) (similar); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Law: An Economic Perspective 184 (1976) (similar). The current law is described
in 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&725-730 (3d ed.
2008).
17

See 3B Antitrust Law, Ch. 7D-3.
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satisfy any Sherman Act standard of illegality. 18
The sacrifice test does not require balancing of gains and
harms. One looks at things exclusively from the defendant's
perspective and asks whether the defendant has sacrificed short
term profits in exchange for the benefits of monopoly down the road.
One does not need to net out gains to the monopolist against loss to
consumers, competitors, or the general economy.
A particular problem with sacrifice tests is that most
substantial investments involve a short term "sacrifice" of dollars in
anticipation of increased revenue at some future point. The
automobile manufacturer who constructs a new plant is certainly in
such a position. It spends money on the plant during a lengthy
period of planning and construction, hoping to realize higher profits
several years later after the plant goes into production. To be sure,
the profitability of the new plant need not "depend on" harmful effects
on a rival, but in a concentrated market it is certainly likely to have
such effects. Further, the new plant might not succeed unless rivals
were forced to reduce their own output; nevertheless, building a new
plant under such circumstances is almost always procompetitive.
Likewise, product innovations are always costly to the
defendant, and their success may very well depend on their ability to
exclude rivals from the market, but neither of these factors is or
should be decisive in subsequent antitrust litigation. All innovation is
costly, and many successful innovations succeed only because
consumers substitute away from rivals' older versions and toward the
innovator's version. The goal of innovation is increased sales, and
one increases one's sales either by bringing new customers into the
market or else by taking customers from rivals. As a result,
willingness to "sacrifice" short-term profits in anticipation of later
monopoly profits does not distinguish anticompetitive from
procompetitive uses of innovation. The distinction lies in the
18

See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2003 WL 21269559, at *16-17, Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
("conduct is exclusionary where it involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or
goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain
monopoly power"); and id. at *19-20 ("If such a refusal involves a sacrifice of
profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only because it
eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary and potentially unlawful.").

10
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character of the innovation itself. 19
The sacrifice test seems to work poorly in areas of '2 law
unrelated to predatory pricing or refusal to deal. Some exclusionary
practices, such as exclusive dealing or tying, exclude immediately
and are likely to be profitable to the dominant firm from the onset of
the practice, so neither short term sacrifice nor subsequent
recoupment is necessary to make the practice profitable. 20 The
same thing might be said of restrictive IP licensing practices, many of
which are best analogized to either exclusive dealing or tying. 21
19

See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &776 (3d
ed. 2008).
20

See, e.g., 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1802 (2d ed. 2004)
(exclusive dealing foreclosing rivals); id, &1803 (same; output contract); id., &1804
(same; raising rivals' costs).
In Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC, Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d on other
grounds, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008), the FTC held that the "sacrifice" test for
exclusionary conduct did not apply. Rambus reasoned that because its refusal to
share information with JEDEC provided immediate benefit to Rambus, it would not
qualify as conduct that involved the immediate sacrifice of profits in anticipation of
exclusion of rivals, or that made no economic sense except for the elimination of
competition. The Commission opined that those tests might make sense in the
context of refusal to deal or predatory pricing claims, but not here. As the
Commission explained:
As a matter of law, we recognize that the sacrifice test may be well-suited
to certain types of Section 2 claims where the risk of interfering with
vigorous competitive activity is heightened, but the test is not appropriate
here. It misses conduct that reduces consumer welfare, but happens to be
inexpensive to execute, and therefore does not involve a significant profit
sacrifice. For example, defrauding the PTO in order to secure a patent that
confers a monopoly demands little profit sacrifice, yet the Supreme Court
has held that such fraud can violate Section 2. Likewise, in this case,
without reducing prices, forgoing sales, or even spending substantial funds
beyond what it otherwise would have spent, Rambus's conduct may have
imposed substantial costs on rivals and contributed significantly to the
creation of monopoly power. In cases such as this, the Microsoft analysis
-- with its focus on determining "whether the monopolist's conduct on
balance harms competition" -- is the proper lens for scrutinizing allegedly
exclusionary conduct.
(numerous citations omitted) (to the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by
the defendant after the FTC's remedial order was entered).
21

See Ch. 17G-2; Ch. 20E.
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Other practices, such as improper infringement suits, are
often costly to the defendant in the short-run whether or not they are
anticompetitive. Indeed, the improper patent infringement suit is
likely to be most costly to the dominant firm when the infringement
defendant has the resources to defend it; and may not be particularly
costly when the infringement defendants are nascent firms who are
easily excluded from the market.
"No Economic Sense"
The "no economic sense" test, which is similar to the sacrifice
test in many respects, would refuse to condemn exclusionary single
firm conduct "unless it would make no economic sense for the
defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition." 22
The "no economic sense" test offers good insights into when
aggressive actions by a single firm go too far, but it can lead to
erroneous results unless complicating qualifications are added. Like
the "sacrifice" test, it does not seek to measure general welfare or
consumer welfare, nor does it seek to "balance" gains to the
monopolist against losses to consumers, rivals, or others.
Theoretically, an act might benefit the defendant very slightly while
doing considerable harm to the rest of the economy, and it would be
lawful. Or conceivably, an act could be unlawful because its only
benefit accrued from a lessening of competition, but the benefit was
greater than any losses that lessened competition imposed.
Not all monopolizing conduct that we might wish to condemn
is "irrational" in the sense that the only explanation that makes it
seem profitable is destruction or discipline of rivals. Indeed,
monopolizing conduct is not necessarily costly to the defendant. For
example, supplying false information or failing to disclose important
information to a government official or standard setting organization
need not cost any more than supplying truthful information, but it can
create monopoly under appropriate circumstances. 23 Indeed, the
22

Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). See Gregory Werden, The "No
Economic Sense" Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J.Corp.L. 293 (2006); A
Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary
Conduct -- are There Unifying Principles, 73 Antitrust L.J. 375 (2006).
23

E.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382

12
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provision of false information may be less costly than provision of
truthful information, for false information is easier and cheaper to
manufacture. Further, the provision of such information to a
government official might be profitable (i.e., "make sense") whether it
destroys a rival or merely if it results in increased output to the
defendant. For example, the firm that acquires a patent by making
false statements to the patent examiner and then brings infringement
actions against rivals might be dominant and bent on protecting that
position. 24 But it might also be one of many firms in a product
differentiated market, seeking to do no more than protect its sales
from a close substitute. In either case the restraint on innovation and
resulting harm to consumers is clear.
Other conduct, such as tying or exclusive dealing, can be
profitable to the defendant from the onset but may also be
anticompetitive if it excludes rivals and thereby injures consumers. 25
Such conduct makes "economic sense" if it merely enlarges the
defendant's output but may be even more profitable if it raises rivals'
costs or injures them so that they cannot compete effectively with the
defendant.
Conduct capable of excluding equally efficient rival
Judge Posner's definition of exclusionary conduct requires the
plaintiff to show:
that the defendant has monopoly power and ... that the
challenged practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude
from the defendant's market an equally or more efficient
U.S. 172 (1965) (maintaining infringement suit on patent obtained by fraud);
Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC, Aug. 2, 2006) (providing false information
to private standard setting organization with the result that organization
unknowingly adopts standards protected by defendant's IP rights). See also
Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006 WL 2458717 (slip copy) (N.D.Cal. Aug 22,
2006) (NO. C06-02361 WHA) (refusing to dismiss Walker Process style
counterclaim against Netflix on business method patent, based on Netflix's alleged
failure to disclose prior art in patent application).
24

E.g,. Walker Process, id.

25

E.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1089 (2006) (condemning exclusive dealing in action
brought by government).
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competitor. The defendant can rebut by proving that although
it is a monopolist and the challenged practice exclusionary,
the practice is, on balance, efficient. 26
This definition has enjoyed some recognition in the case law.
For example, in condemning the targeted package discounts at issue
in LePage's, the Third Circuit observed that "even an equally efficient
rival may find it impossible to compensate for lost discounts on
products that it does not produce." 27 As we show elsewhere, a
specifically tailored discount aggregated over multiple products can
exclude an equally efficient rival that makes only one or a subset of
the products in question. 28
The "equally efficient rival" test has also found acceptance in
predatory pricing cases, particularly in discussions of how to identify
a price as predatory. It is not so obviously related to the
"recoupment" requirement in predation cases. 29
The reasoning behind the equally efficient rival test is that a
firm should not be penalized for having lower costs than its rivals and
pricing accordingly. As a result, a price is predatory only if it is
reasonably calculated to exclude a rival who is at least as efficient as
the defendant. 30 Judge Posner's own examples in defense of his
definition pertain to pricing. He writes that it
26

Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194-195 (2d ed. 2001).

27

LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
28

See 3A Antitrust Law &749.

29

See 3A Antitrust Law &&725-727.

30

See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st
Cir. 1983) (noting that an "avoidable" or "incremental" cost test for predatory
pricing is irrational because it would be less costly for the defendant to halt
production; and moreover, "equally efficient competitors cannot permanently match
this low price and stay in business."). See also MCI Communic. Corp. v. AT&T,
708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (similar,
predatory pricing); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 515 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated
on other grds., 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (same, predatory pricing); Ortho Diagnostic
Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 920 F.Supp. 455, 466-467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or above that level, carries with it the threat
that the party so engaged will drive equally efficient competitors out of business,
thus setting the stage for recoupment at the expense of consumers").

14
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would be absurd to require the firm to hold a price umbrella
over less efficient entrants.... [P]ractices that will exclude only
less efficient firms, such as the monopolist's dropping his price
nearer to (but now below) his cost, are not actionable,
because we want to encourage efficiency. 31

Clearly we do not want low cost firms to hold their prices above
their costs merely to suffer a rival to become established in the
market.
The equally efficient rival definition of exclusionary conduct
can be underdeterrent in situations where the rival that is most likely
to emerge is less efficient than the dominant firm. Consider the filing
of fraudulent or otherwise improper IP infringement claims. 32 The
value of infringement actions as entry deterrence devices is greatest
when the parties have an unequal ability to bear litigation costs. This
will typically be before or soon after the new entrant has begun
production. The filing of a fraudulent patent infringement suit, unlike
setting one's price at or a little above marginal cost, is a socially
useless practice. But the strategy might not be effective against an
equally efficient rival, who could presumably defend and win the
infringement claim. In this case Judge Posner's definition of
exclusionary conduct seems unreasonably lenient. It exonerates the
defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is
most likely to be unreasonably exclusionary.
Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC)
Several anticompetitive actions by dominant firms are best
explained as efforts to limit rivals' market access by increasing their
costs. Such strategies may succeed where more aggressive ones
involving the complete destruction of rivals might not. Once rivals'
costs have been increased the dominant firm can raise its own price
or increase its market share at their expense. 33
31

Posner, Antitrust Law, note 26 at 196.

32

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.

33

See Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986);
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am.Econ.Rev.
267 (1983). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and
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RRC theories show that certain practices that have
traditionally been subjected to antitrust scrutiny can be
anticompetitive even though they do not literally involve the
destruction of rivals. Situations in which rivals stay in the market but
their costs increase may be more likely to occur and exist in a wider
variety than those in which rivals are destroyed. Further, cost raising
strategies might be less detectable and less likely to invite
prosecution. Indeed, a strategy of raising rivals' costs need not
injure a rival severely at all if the dominant firm increases its own
prices to permit smaller firms a price hike that compensates them for
their cost increase. As a result, RRC augments older antitrust
theories of "foreclosure," but without some of the conceptual
problems that accompanied foreclosure theories. Many cases
brought under both ''1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have
acknowledged the theory. 34
Critique, 2001 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 257.
For a critique, see Posner, Antitrust Law note 26 at 196. However, Judge
Posner's first objection is that reducing one's own costs may raise a rivals' costs by
denying the latter the ability to exploit relevant scale economies. While that is true,
it does not suggest that every RRC strategy involves cost reductions to the
dominant firm. Second, Judge Posner notes, a strategy such as predatory pricing
does not really raise a rival's costs but rather denies it revenue.
Closely related to RRC except more aggressive is the standard proposed
in Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253
(2003), which queries "whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in
furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own
efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist
efficiency." The second part of this test would condemn a firm for using practices
that lowered its own costs if, in the process, they denied scale economies to a
rival. See, e.g., Elhauge, id. 324 (arguing that even if economies of scale are very
substantial, above a 50% market share, the firm cannot use exclusive contracts to
increase its output but must simply set its price). The Elhauge test would also
condemn a firm who used a practice that increased its sales beyond the point that
its scale economies topped out, if in so doing it denied scale economies to a rival.
See id. at 324 (illustration of firm whose tie, exclusive deal, or other agreement
requires customers to purchase 70% of the market from it, even though its
economies of scale top out at 40%). Assuming such tests were desirable, they
make severe demands on tribunals to measure relevant scale economies. See 2A
Antitrust Law &408.
34

E.g., Microsoft, note 1, 253 F.3d at 70 (defendant's exclusionary contracts
relegated rival Netscape to higher cost distribution channels); Dentsply, note 25,
399 F.3d at 191 (similar; defendant's exclusive dealing arrangements relegated
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Of course, the law has never required complete market
exclusion as a prerequisite to suit. Indeed, some successful '2
plaintiffs have both grown their market shares and earned high
profits even through the period that the exclusionary practices were
occurring. 35
RRC is a sometimes useful but also incomplete definition of
exclusionary practices. Further, many practices that raise rivals'
cost, such as innovation that either deprives rivals or revenue or
forces them to innovate in return, are also welfare enhancing. As a
result, "raising rivals' costs" can never operate as a complete test for
exclusionary conduct. 36 One must always add "unreasonably," but
that invariably requires some kind of balancing or trade off.
rivals to inferior distribution alternatives, citing 11 Antitrust Law &1802c); JTC
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778-779 (7th Cir.1999)
(members of cartel may have paid off suppliers to charge cartel rivals significantly
higher prices, thus creating a price umbrella under which the cartel could operate);
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123 (1998) (similar); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114
F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd on nonantitrust grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999)
(health care provider's policy of shifting indigent patients to rivals could have effect
of raising their costs); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Legal and Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1553 (10th Cir.1995)
(dominant firm's practice of scheduling its own full slate of classes so as to conflict
with rivals' specialized classes could have had effect of raising the rival's cost of
distributing its own product); Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th 1987) (alleged agreement between union and
contractors' association under which union would obtain fee from all employers
without whom it had collective bargaining agreements, whether or not they were
association members, to be paid to the association, probably intended to raise the
costs of non-member contractors). Cf. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting RRC claim that Blue
Cross forced hospitals to submit lower bids for taking care of BC patients, with
result that it had to impose higher charges on non-BC patients).
35

E.g., Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 784 (6th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003). The plaintiff claimed that its market
share would have grown even faster and that it would have earned even more
profits but for the exclusionary conduct.
36

This is apparently the source of Judge Posner's objection. See Posner,
Antitrust Law note 26 at 196, referring to RRC as "not a happy formula" because
one way of raising rivals' costs is to be more efficient than the rival, thus denying it
scale economies.
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Summary
The development of a verbally simple monopolization test is
more than an exercise in logic. It requires numerous experiencebased judgments about the incentives that dominant firms face, the
danger of false positives or occasionally negatives, and the
measurement limitations of antitrust tribunals. Each of the previously
discussed definitions of anticompetitive unilateral conduct has much
to be said for it, and each is helpful in the analysis of some types of
exclusionary behavior. However, none accounts for every type of
behavior that we would wish to be addressed by '2. Others might
think differently.

Formulations Requiring "Purpose" or "Intent"
In describing the conduct element of the monopolizing
offense, numerous cases have employed terms such as "purpose,"
"intent," "willfulness," or "not inevitable." For example, in the early
Standard Oil decision, 37 Chief Justice White noted the defendant's
anticompetitive behavior but felt compelled to speak of intent:
[Defendant's many acquisitions and mergers give rise] in the
absence of countervailing circumstances, . . . to the prima
facie presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the
dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal
methods of industrial development, but by new means of
combination . . . with the purpose of excluding others from the
trade and thus centralizing in the combination a perpetual
control of the movements of petroleum and its products in the
channels of interstate commerce. . . .
[This] prima facie presumption of intent to restrain trade
. . . to bring about monopolization . . . is made conclusive by
considering [other elements of defendant's behavior in
addition to the mergers and acquisitions]. . . . 38

37

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

38

Id. at 75.
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And in the first Tobacco case, he found it necessary to speak of
both "wrongful purpose and illegal combination." 39
One might have supposed that any requirement of wrongful
purpose was later obviated by Judge Learned Hand's declaration in
Alcoa that
We disregard any question of "intent." . . . [Because we are
satisfied that illegality does not depend upon a showing of
practices that are unlawful in and of themselves and apart
from the existence of monopoly power,] the issue of intent
ceases to have any importance; no intent is relevant except
that which is relevant to any liability, criminal or civil: i.e., an
intent to bring about the forbidden act. . . . In order to fall
within '2, the monopolist must have both the power to
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read [this] as
demanding any "specific" intent, makes nonsense of it, for no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing. . .
. 40
The Supreme Court endorsed Alcoa's general approach in the
second Tobacco case. 41 And in Griffith the Court found specific
intent necessary only in attempt cases:
It is . . . not always necessary to find a specific intent to
restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the
anti-trust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that a
restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequence of a
defendant's conduct or business arrangements. . . . Specific
intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is
necessary only where the acts fall short of the results
condemned by the Act. . . . 42
At the same time, however, the Griffith Court also said:
39

United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911).

40

United States v. Aluminum Co. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 431-432 (2d Cir.

1945).
41

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946).

42

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
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[T]he existence of power "to exclude competition when it is
desired to do so" is itself a violation of '2, provided it is
coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power. 43
And later in the Grinnell case the Court said that:
The offense of monopoly . . . has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 44
Finally, in Professional Real Estate the Supreme Court
concluded that alleged monopolizing conduct in the filing of an
allegedly baseless copyright infringement suit could be evaluated
only by considering the antitrust defendant's "subjective motivation"
in bringing the suit. 45
Not only are these formulations inconsistent, they are also not
helpful and sometimes misleading. To be sure, in some cases the
defendant's "purpose or intent" may be enlightening. For example, in
cases of ambiguity "knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences." 46

43

Id. at 107.

44

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966).

45

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993):
Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine
the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition
of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.... (citations omitted).
46

Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See
also Taylor Pub. Co. v. Jostens, 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000) (intent evidence
useful for helping the court to characterize ambiguous conduct, quoting 11
Antitrust Law &806e in the previous edition). See use of intent evidence to
interpret ambiguous conduct, see &b2.
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Thus knowledge of intent may be more helpful in cases
involving practices such as refusal to deal, which can have
numerous explanations and are very difficult to characterize as
competitive or anticompetitive. In its Aspen decision, which was
such a situation, the Supreme Court elaborated. In the case of
attempt to monopolize, the plaintiff must show the defendant's
"'specific intent' to accomplish the forbidden objective." By contrast,
in the case of monopolization "intent is merely relevant to the
question whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as
'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive." 47
In Brooke, which involved predatory pricing, the Supreme
Court spoke of intent as nothing more than Judge Hand's
consciousness of what one is doing. 48 The Court referred repeatedly
to the "intended victim" of predatory pricing, without elaborating on
the nature of any intent showing that might be required. 49 But the
Court also made clear that, even if the defendant had intended
anticompetitive consequences, the plaintiff's failure to show objective
evidence of recoupment defeated its claim. 50
47

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602
(1985). The Court's subsequent Trinko decision, note 18, said little about
subjective intent, except to observe that in that particular situation involving an
alleged refusal to deal:
the defendant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its
refusal to deal--upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by
competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
48

See text at note 40 (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431-432).

49

See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225 ("intended effects on the firm's
rivals"); ibid. ("intended victim" and "intended target").
50

Id. at 231:

Although Brown & Williamson's entry into the generic segment could be
regarded as procompetitive in intent as well as effect, the record contains
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
Brown & Williamson envisioned or intended this anticompetitive course of
events.... Liggett has failed to demonstrate competitive injury as a matter
of law, however, because its proof is flawed in a critical respect: The
evidence is inadequate to show that in pursuing this scheme, Brown &
Williamson had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from
below-cost pricing through slowing the growth of generics.
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Antitrust appraisal of conduct depends on an understanding of
its likely anticompetitive consequences as well as its possible social
benefits. In most cases an inquiry into subjective intent is
unnecessary. But sometimes the benefits of the defendant's conduct
will not be apparent or persuasive unless the defendant identifies its
purpose in so acting, shows the legitimacy of that purpose in terms
of antitrust objectives, and that the challenged action is an
appropriate and perhaps the least restrictive way of achieving that
legitimate purpose. The critical point is that the nature and
consequences of a particular practice are the vital consideration, not
the purpose or intent. Qualifying anticompetitive conduct must
always be established first by objective facts about the relevant
market and the defendant, quite apart from any manifestation of
intent.
Further, any competitively energetic firm "intends" to prevail
over its actual or potential rivals. The firm that drives out or excludes
rivals by selling a superior product or producing at substantially lower
costs certainly intends to do so. But to find the requisite "purpose or
intent" in such conduct would be to read the behavior requirement
out of the monopolization offense altogether and make monopoly
unlawful per se. This the courts clearly have not done. More
importantly, it confuses the "intent" to behave competitively with the
intent to monopolize. Indeed, in most circumstances the "intent" to
do one cannot be distinguished from the intent to do another. For
example, the dominant firm who cuts price in order to increase its
own sales undoubtedly knows -- and thus "intends" 51 -- that the
result will be increased pressure on rivals, declining sales, or
perhaps even their exit from the market. 52 In concentrated markets
Accord Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127
S.Ct. 1069, 1071 (2007), which spoke of anticompetitive predatory buying as being
for "anticompetitive purposes," but insisted on a test that measured market
structure (recoupment) and required prices below cost.
51

The common law often infers intent from knowledge.
See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) Torts '825 (1977), defining an "intentional" invasion of
property as occurring when the actor either (a) "acts for the purpose of causing it"
or (b) "knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his
conduct."
52

See generally, 3A Antitrust Law, Ch. 7C (3d ed. 2008).
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the "intent" to increase one's own sales substantially is equivalent to
the "intent" to take sales from rivals; spending resources to
distinguish the two is pointless and silly. Further, even socially
beneficial behavior can yield monopoly.
In a perfectly competitive market each firm "intends" to
maximize its own profits and is completely unconcerned about
responses from rivals. 53 In that case it may be quite meaningful to
speak of a firm as "intending" to increase its own profits, but not as
"intending" to harm any particular rival. But in the more concentrated
markets in which most plausible monopolization claims are made,
firms cannot act rationally without considering effects on, and
responses of, particular rivals. It becomes quite meaningless to
speak, for example, of General Motors as "intending" to increase its
own sales of pickup trucks, but not as "intending" to take those sales
from Ford, Chrysler, or Toyota. 54 As a result, any formulation which
permits GM to "intend" to increase its own sales or profits, but that
prohibits it from "intending" to injure rivals is nonsense.
In the great majority of antitrust cases talk of "purpose or
intent" is largely diversionary or redundant. Thus, in Standard Oil
and the first Tobacco cases, Chief Justice White conclusively
inferred wrongful purpose from wrongful conduct. The result would
have been the same and the analysis clearer had he spoken
exclusively of conduct and avoided any incorporation of "intent."
The same may be said of the term "willful." The Grinnell
Court stated the formula for the '2 offense as being monopoly plus
"willful acquisition or maintenance." Although willfulness usually
connotes something about intent, the Court contrasted "willful" with
"justifiable." It indicated that a monopoly achieved or maintained
because defendant's products were superior is not "willful." This is a
misuse of language: a firm that deliberately creates and markets an
overpoweringly superior product has "willfully" acquired the resultant
monopoly. Further, every firm "willfully" maintains its profits or
53

On perfect competition, see 2B Antitrust Law &402.

54

To be sure, one can imagine a situation where all increased sales come
from new customers and none are taken from rivals, but such a situation does not
exist when the strategizing firm and its rivals are in the same properly defined
relevant market.
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market share, or "wilfully" refuses to yield market share to new
rivals. 55
In sum, in defining the behavioral component of the
monopolization offense, one must concentrate on conduct and define
the characteristics of conduct that are undesirable. Despite loose
language, this is in fact what the courts have attempted to do. They
have focused on conduct while talking about intent.
Ambiguous conduct
The ambiguity problem most often arises when conduct did
not or may not have had its intended consequences. For example, a
firm does not violate '2 by innovating a better product, even if the
innovation has the effect of expanding or maintaining monopoly
power. Some innovations both harm rivals and fail to benefit
consumers. However, the consequences of innovation are difficult to
predict, and even a dominant firm cannot be required to expand or
innovate at its peril. This suggests two things: first, ex ante rather
than ex post analysis is the most helpful. Second, considerations of
subjective intent are sometimes essential, provided that exclusion
has been objectively proven.
In the C.R.Bard case defendant Bard was found to have a
55

Both Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery also used the term "not
inevitable." See Alcoa, note 40 at 431 ("It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should
always anticipate increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply
them"); and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (speaking of Judge Hand's
Alcoa decision as concluding that a firm had "'monopolized' if, regardless of its
intent, it had achieved a monopoly by maneuvers which, though 'honestly
industrial', were not economically inevitable, but were rather the result of the firm's
free choice of business policies.") Later in the same opinion Judge Wyzanski
spoke of the source of USM's market power as not "an adaptation to inevitable
economic laws" (id. at 343) -- something that would presumably characterize a
natural monopoly market. But if these formulations are meant to be a definition of
monopolizing conduct they suffer from the same basic defect of failing to
distinguish between socially beneficial and socially harmful conduct. It is also not
inevitable that a firm exclude rivals by building a better mousetrap or by building it
more cheaply: to make "inevitability" the touchstone would thus be to condemn the
very kind of conduct that it is the purpose of antitrust law to promote. Clearly
Judge Wyzanski was not using the phrase in this perverse sense. And it would
have been clear that Judge Hand was not either, except for his condemnation of
Alcoa for expanding capacity to meet demand.
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monopoly position in a patented "gun" for taking tissue samples from
patients. 56 While the gun itself was durable hardware, it used
disposable, one-use needles, and these were originally supplied by
both Bard and others, including the plaintiff. Bard then modified the
gun so that it would take only proprietary needles manufactured by
Bard. This exclusion of rival needle makers was the basis of the '2
claim, in which a divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed liability.
A nondominant maker of biopsy guns would have no incentive
to make a gun incompatible with others' needles unless the
gun/needle combination were a significant improvement over prior
technology. The nondominant firm maximizes its profits, ceteris
paribus, by maximizing compatibility. 57 As a result, a finding of
strong dominance of a properly defined relevant market is essential.
Further, both the patent laws and the general policy of the
antitrust laws would permit Bard to innovate to make a better gun,
even if the result were a re-designed needle that was incompatible
with the needles of rivals. Further, innovation is risky and
undertaken under great uncertainty. Many planned innovations do
not meet with market success. As a result, one cannot look ex post,
proclaim that the innovated gun is no better than the earlier gun, and
conclude that the innovation is anticompetitive. The real question is
what the innovator had in mind. If Bard's intent was to develop a
superior gun, but this required a unique needle, then Bard should not
be penalized because its new gun/needle combination ended up
working no better (or only a little better) than the old combination did.
Thus Aspen emphasized that the defendant did not refuse to
participate in the skiing joint venture because it could offer a better
product on its own or because customers had rejected the joint
venture's offerings. 58 To the contrary, customers preferred the joint
venture. Ski Co. did what it did only in order to injure a rival. Thus
the Court approved a jury instruction to the effect that exclusionary
conduct by a dominant firm is unlawful when it "unnecessarily
56

C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999).
57

See the discussion infra.

58

Aspen, note 15.
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excludes or handicaps competitors." 59 This includes "conduct which
does not benefit consumers by making a better product or service
available--or in other ways--and instead has the effect of impairing
competition.") 60 The courts often say that such conduct lacks a
"legitimate business purpose." 61 What this means is that if the
dominant firm marketed or structured its product in a way that made
it more difficult for rivals or potential rivals to sell their product, and if
this marketing or restructuring was not reasonably necessary to
improve the defendant's own product, or if it produced more harm
than reasonably necessary, then the dominant firm has violated '2. 62
Injury to Rivals
A sine qua non of anticompetitive conduct is that it enlarges
(or preserves) the defendant's market share at the expense of rivals.
Thus the first requirement for exclusionary conduct is injury to rivals.
Exclusionary behavior must be conduct that prevents actual or
potential rivals from competing or which impairs their opportunities to
do so effectively.
But this term and the root idea are much too broad, for they
embrace competitive as well as anticompetitive behavior: all
59

Aspen, note 15, 472 U.S. at 597.

60

See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp.,
910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 649 (10th Cir. 1987).
61

Aspen, 472 U.S. at 597; Multistate Legal Studies, note 34, 63 F.3d at
1550 (conduct not unlawful unless it lacks a "legitimate business justification);
General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987)
(equating conduct "without a legitimate business purpose" with conduct "that
makes sense only because it eliminates competition"). Other courts sometimes
distinguish conduct that merely injures competitors from conduct that harms the
"competitive process." Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21
(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
62

See, e.g., Multistate Legal Studies, note 34, 63 F.3d at 1550, where the
defendant offered both a general bar review course, in which it had a dominant
position, and a complementary professional responsibility course, while the plaintiff
offered only the latter. The court denied summary judgment on evidence that the
defendant intentionally scheduled sessions of its general bar review course so as
to conflict with the only times that the plaintiff's PR course could be offered, thus
forcing students to take the defendant's PR course.
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successful competitive moves tend to exclude, particularly in
oligopoly markets. Nevertheless, while some novel term might be
preferable, we shall use the term "exclusionary" as a short-hand
description of "monopolizing" conduct, even though it is not precisely
descriptive.
So the first step in defining "exclusionary" conduct is to state
what it clearly is not. Our concern about monopoly and the
opportunities of rivals must not be allowed to obscure the objective of
antitrust law, which seeks to protect the process of competition on
the merits and the economic results associated with workable
competition. 63 Accordingly, aggressive but non-predatory pricing,
higher output, improved product quality, energetic market
penetration, successful research and development, cost-reducing
innovations, and the like are welcomed by the Sherman Act. They
are therefore not to be considered "exclusionary" for '2 purposes
even though they tend to exclude rivals and may even create a
monopoly. 64
We attempt no further catalogue of desirable behavior at this
point, but rest for the moment on the desirability of behavior
63

Later discussions will show numerous instances where both courts and
enforcement authorities appear to have sacrificed competitive objectives in order
to protect particular competitors.
64

We find quite unhelpful and even counterproductive the formulation given
in some decisions that a '2 violation occurs when the monopolist uses its market
power to "obtain a competitive advantage" over a rival. Read literally, the
"competitive advantage" formulation condemns any attempt by a dominant firm to
take advantage of economies unavailable to smaller rivals. The relevant question
is not whether the monopolist uses its position to obtain a "competitive advantage,"
but how it does so.
The "competitive advantage" formulation was given in Griffith, note 42 at
107, in reference to non-monopolistic "leveraging." See 3 Antitrust Law &652. But
the Griffith statement was then quoted in Kodak in reference to monopolization
itself. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 482483 (1992) (to the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by the defendant after
remand). See also Poster Exchange v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d
334, 339 n. 13 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (monopolist's
decision to charge retail prices to competing wholesaler was unlawful if done "to
gain a competitive advantage"); and Great Western Directories v. Southwestern
Bell Tel., 63 F.3d 1378, 1386 (5th Cir. 1995) (apparently approving Poster
Exchange formulation).
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constituting competition on the merits -- the superior skill, foresight,
and industry of which Judge Hand spoke. Antitrust law should not
impose sanctions for the very conduct it would encourage. Behavior
that is no more restrictive of rivals' opportunities than is reasonably
necessary to effect competition on the merits is and should be
approved by Sherman Act '2. 65 Such behavior is, after all,
indispensable if the antitrust laws are to achieve their objective.
Thus, "exclusionary" comprehends at the most behavior that not only
(1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does
not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily
restrictive way.
Cost-reducing conduct
Conduct that reduces the defendant's costs typically injures
rivals, except in highly competitive markets, but it virtually always
benefits consumers. Identifying the rare case where it does not
taxes the tribunal's measurement capabilities so severely that it
cannot be controlled without discouraging socially beneficial
behavior.
One can imagine a scenario in which a firm builds a large
plant that enables it to undersell rivals, does so for a period of time
and then raises price after rivals have been destroyed. At that point
the firm might enjoy both reduced costs and monopoly prices, which
may be higher than the preceding competitive price. But such
conduct has been analyzed under the rubric of above cost predatory
pricing and universally rejected by the courts. 66
Output Increasing Conduct
Consumers are generally benefitted by higher output, which is
nearly always accompanied by lower prices. As a result
considerable care must be exercised before conduct that clearly
increases the defendant's output is condemned as monopolistic.
When a firm is earning positive returns on each unit an output
65

This approximates Judge Wyzanski's formulation in United Shoe, note 55.
See 3 Antitrust Law &614.
66

Cf. DuPont (Titanium-Dioxide), 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980). See 3A Antitrust
Law &&737d, 741.
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increase is profitable, quite aside from impact on competitors. Since
output increases are presumptively in the best interest of consumers
as well a court must be wary of condemning above cost output
increasing conduct. Thus Judge Hand erred in Alcoa when he
condemned the aluminum monopolist for embracing every
competitive opportunity by building a larger plant with greater
capacity to meet new demand. 67
These observations are not categorical. For example,
predatory pricing involves a significant increase in output which must
accompany price cuts to below cost levels. But the increased output
in a properly defined strategy of predatory pricing is only temporary,
for the predation period will be followed by a "recoupment" period in
which output will be reduced and prices increased. 68
Further, an output increase by the dominant firm does not
necessarily correspond with a marketwide output increase, and only
the latter benefits consumers. For example, extreme cases of tying,
exclusive dealing, package discounts, or similar practices can
produce an output increase for the defendant at above cost prices
but also cause competitive harm. 69 Or an improperly brought patent
infringement suit might oust a nascent rival and enable the dominant
firm to keep its own output higher, but overall market output would
decline for lack of competition. 70
Actual or Prospective Consumer Harm; Balancing
Not all conduct that injures rivals is anticompetitive -- indeed,
67

United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945):

It was not inevitable that it [Alcoa] should always anticipate increases in
the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. . . . [W]e can think
of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.
68

See 3A Antitrust Law &&725-727.

69

On tying, see 9-10 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17; exclusive dealing, id., Ch. 18;
package discounts, 3A Antitrust Law &749.
70

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.
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most is not. The conduct that '2 brands as anticompetitive must
additionally cause or threaten harm to consumers from lower market
output, higher prices, reduced innovation, or some other indicator of
diminished competitiveness. We consider whether this consumer
harm must actually have occurred, or whether it may merely be
threatened, and if the latter, the degree of the threat. We also
comment briefly on the nature of the proof and the relation to
remedies.
Relation to Plaintiff and Requested Relief
Monopoly harms consumers by producing higher prices,
restricting innovation, or reducing the array of choices that
consumers would face under more competitive conditions. Properly
defined monopolizing conduct harms consumers by creating
monopoly, increasing its amount, or extending its duration. Thus an
expectation of consumer harm must always be at the logical end of
any determination that a particular act "monopolizes," and thus
satisfies '2's conduct requirement.
But this is not the same thing as showing that consumer harm
has in fact resulted from the challenged practice. This is clearest in
the case of the government suit. The government generally sues to
"enforce" the antitrust laws, not to obtain recompense for completed
harms. The social cost of any harmful practice is minimized when
the practice is apprehended before it occurs or in an early stage.
Clearly the government must show that a certain instance of conduct
is likely to cause consumer harm in the form of increased or
prolonged monopoly, and that this conduct is not accompanied by an
offsetting social benefit. But to delay suit until consumer harm has
actually occurred would be to increase the social cost of monopoly
unnecessarily. The proviso, of course, is that it may be more difficult
to identify conduct as anticompetitive when the results have not yet
materialized.
This principle is hardly unique to antitrust law. For example,
while the private plaintiff may sue the drunken driver only to
recompense a completed wrong, such as wrongful death or property
damage, the government may arrest and condemn the drunken
driver who has not yet caused harm to anyone. The point is that
drunken driving is highly likely to cause social harm and it is less
socially costly to arrest such a driver before rather than after that
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harm occurs.
The private plaintiff suing only in equity resembles the
government's position more closely but is still distinct. The statute
permits such a plaintiff to enjoin "threatened" harms.71 The main
difference with the government's position is proximity. For example,
a dominant firm's fraudulent procurement and enforcement of
patents might cause consumer harm only in several years, after the
market sees the result of reduced competitiveness. A particular
consumer in this market might not be able to show sufficiently
proximate injury to maintain even an equity suit. But the government
could do so, presumably without any showing of immediate harm to
consumers. By contrast, a competitor excluded by a fraudulent
patent suit could sue immediately -- and may be required to do so via
a compulsory counterclaim 72 -- even though consumer injury had not
yet occurred. Indeed, we would not make the competitor's lawsuit
depend on a showing that consumer harm would occur in the
particular case. The targets of improper infringement suits are often
nascent firms which may or may not succeed in the market. Antitrust
goals are furthered by deterring such suits if they are improper, a fact
which does not depend on proof that the competitor, if not victimized
by the wrongful suit, would have succeeded in making the market
more competitive.
Both consumers and competitors seeking damages must
show actual harm. Consumers must generally show actual harm in
the form of higher prices or reduced innovation. By contrast,
competitors must show actual harm both to themselves and to the
ordinary market processes that could otherwise be expected to
produce or maintain competition. Once again, however, consumer
harm may be threatened rather than realized. For example, the rival
who successfully prosecutes a '2 counterclaim to an infringement
suit based on an invalid patent will be able to obtain damages even
though the consumer harm from this wrongful infringement suit is
71

See 15 U.S.C. '26 ("Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws...."); see 2A Antitrust Law &326.
72

See Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intl., Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019(2001) (antitrust counterclaim to patent
infringement suit was compulsory and thus could not be brought after infringement
suit was completed).
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threatened rather than actual. 73
But these differences in the nature of proof should not
obscure the basic point: in all cases the plaintiff must show conduct
that either has or is reasonably calculated to create, enlarge, or
prolong monopoly, without substantial offsetting benefits. In such
cases consumer harm is always in prospect, even though it has not
already occurred.
Unjustified Conduct
Even though monopolistic conduct requires proof of actual or
threatened consumer harm, the proof need not invariably be
elaborate. The easiest case is conduct by a monopolist that clearly
injures rivals and has no business justification. In that case
consumer harm can sometimes be inferred from the injury to
competitors itself. 74 For example, little purpose would be served by
requiring proof of consumer harm in a case where the defendant
brought an infringement action on a fraudulently obtained patent. 75
The only purpose in bringing such a suit is improper exclusion of
rivals. About the best that can be said for such an action is it might
fail and result in no harm at all, but it is not likely to produce a social
benefit.
Balancing Generally to be Avoided; Burden-shifting
The law of exclusionary practices lies at the center of
antitrust's rule of reason, where it is often said that the court must
"balance" the threat of competitive harm against consumer gains.
We question that assumption. 76 Many practices capable of creating
or maintaining a monopoly by impairing the opportunities of rivals
create no benefits at all. For many others the claimed benefits could
readily be achieved by a less harmful alternative.
73

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.
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On this point, see Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition
Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 495 (1999).
75

See 3 Antitrust Law &706.

76

See generally Ch. 15.
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In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit appeared to state a balancing
requirement for close cases. If the plaintiff had shown a qualifying
exclusionary act with an anticompetitive effect and the defendant had
presented an unrebutted justification, then "the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs
the procompetitive benefit." 77 Interestingly, however, the court never
attempted any real balancing. In most cases it either condemned the
conduct when the defendant had not offered an adequate
justification, or refused to condemn it once the justification had been
accepted.
Nevertheless, in at least a few cases conduct that causes
some benefit and unavoidably threatens harm must be evaluated.
On the one hand, the tribunal must have a way of deciding how to
weigh them against each other. On the other, no court could
quantify the economic harm that might result from the defendant's
exercise of market power and balance this against any efficiency
gains said to result from it, at least not in close cases. Of course,
balancing need not be difficult in every case; one does not need a
fine set of scales to know what will happen when an elephant sits on
one side of a see-saw and a mouse on the other.
A burden-shifting analysis should enable courts to avoid
"close" balancing in most situations. The rule of reason applied in
cases involving unilateral conduct need not differ significantly from
that applied to multilateral conduct. 78 The principal difference
between '1 and '2 is that the existence of an agreement among
competitors shifts the scale against the defendants. As a result, in
close cases it is proper to condemn the arrangement by resolving
uncertainties against the defendant. By contrast, when the
challenged conduct is unilateral the court must be somewhat more
cautious. We would be inclined to resolve close cases in favor of the
defendant. But we re-emphasize, as Microsoft suggests, that cases
involving (a) a truly exclusionary practice, (b) offset by a compelling
efficiency explanation, and (c) with no less restrictive alternative will
be uncommon.

77

Microsoft, note 1, 253 F.3d at 59.

78

See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1512 (2d
ed. 2005).
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The most important exception is predatory pricing. Some
balancing of benefits and harms may be essential because
aggressive pricing appears to confer short-term benefits but may
harm consumers in the long run. In price predation cases the
Supreme Court requires the dual showing of prices below cost and a
reasonable prospect of "recoupment" during a subsequent period of
monopoly prices. In such a case the requirement of harms
disproportionate to the benefits is met if the monopoly profits earned
during the recoupment period exceed the cost of charging belowcost prices, which constitutes the saving to consumers. 79
Conduct Rational Only for Dominant Firm;
Creation vs. Maintenance of Monopoly
Most exclusionary conduct by dominant firms is strategic.
Nondominant firms acting unilaterally typically lack the market
position to make much strategic conduct work. Consider the
Microsoft litigation. 80 A nondominant seller of computer operating
systems would have every incentive to maximize compatibility with
other types of software, such as internet browsers or word
processors, even if it sold these applications itself. After all, it would
be competing in the market with sellers of other operating systems,
and customer choice would be heavily driven by compatibility
concerns. But a market dominating seller of operating systems
stands in a different position: by limiting compatibility with rivals'
software applications it can force buyers to switch to its own
applications. Thus it becomes important to restrain the innovations
of others or keep them out of the market.
In other cases conduct challenged as exclusionary could be
profitable for either a monopolist or a non-monopolist. For example,
even a relatively small oligopolist in a product differentiated market
might profit from fraudulent patent infringement suits calculated to
protect its particular product variation from close copying. 81
But both types of conduct are covered by the statute, which is
79

These matters are taken up in Ch. 7C.

80

See note 1.
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On such suits, see 3 Antitrust Law &706.
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concerned with the maintenance, or prolongation, or monopoly as
well as with its creation. For example, Grinnell and later Trinko
spoke of the offense as "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident." 82
Substantiality
To find that a monopolist's act may improperly impair rivals'
opportunities and threaten consumer welfare does not say how
substantial a contribution that act has made or may make to
achieving or maintaining the monopoly. The effect may in fact be
marginal or even inconsequential. The act may be incapable of
making a significant contribution, abandoned before it could have
had any such effect, or seem on balance not to have been significant
when compared to scale economies or superior skill as sources of
the particular defendant's power.
However, because monopoly will almost certainly be
grounded in part in factors other than a particular exclusionary act,
no government seriously concerned about the evil of monopoly
would condition its intervention solely on a clear and genuine chain
of causation from exclusionary act to the presence of monopoly.
And so it is sometimes said that doubts should be resolved against
the person whose behavior created the problem. 83 When we cannot
truly find as a fact that an exclusionary act was significant to the
defendant's monopoly, it is said, the defendant must bear the risk of
82

Grinnell, note 44, 384 U.S. at 570-571 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court restated this formulation in Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 540 U.S. at
407. See also Aspen, note 15, 472 U.S. at 602 (speaking of the "purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly," quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
307 (1919). These formulations are widely quoted or paraphrased. See, e.g.,
Kodak, note 64, 504 U.S. at 483 ('2 violated by wilful actions designed to maintain
defendant's monopoly position when not supported by valid business
justifications); Christianson v. Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) ('2 violated by
wilful maintenance of monopoly power as opposed to growth or development that
results from a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident); Hanover
Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 481, 486 (1968) (noting and
approving lower court's conclusion that restrictive lease policies were designed to
maintain defendant's monopoly); C.R. Bard, note 56, 157 F.3d at 1371 (similar).
83

Cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (damages).
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the ignorance created by its own misconduct. The conclusion has
merit, but the reasoning needs to be restated.
Any one exclusionary act may seem trivial. Indeed, we shall
often be unable to find that several such acts, taken together,
probably "caused" or contributed significantly to a defendant's power.
Yet, such acts can determine the often marginal choice of an actual
or potential rival deciding whether to enter or expand. In that event,
it may be fitting to presume the exclusionary act "significant" or
"causally related" to the monopoly power being challenged. That is
the sense in which the defendant is made to suffer the uncertain
consequences of its own undesirable conduct.
But before such a formula can properly be used against the
defendant, it must at least appear plausible to an informed observer
that the exclusionary act could have had, or would probably have, a
significant relationship to the defendant's monopoly. In sum,
"exclusionary" behavior should be taken to mean conduct other than
competition on the merits, or other than restraints reasonably
"necessary" to competition on the merits, that reasonably appear
capable of making a significant contribution to creating or
maintaining monopoly power.
Business Torts or Unfair Methods of Competition
State laws on "unfair competition" or business torts provide
remedies for a variety of competitive practices thought to be
offensive to proper standards of business morality. Under these
laws, false and misleading advertising, trade disparagement, and
"misappropriation" of trade values created by another may entitle
victimized buyers or competing sellers to damages and equitable
relief. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the
Commission to terminate (1) "unfair methods of competition," and (2)
"unfair and deceptive acts or practices." 84 Particularly since 1938,
when Clause (2) was added by amendment, the courts have given
the Commission extremely wide latitude in expanding the scope of
enjoinable conduct without any showing of injury to competition. 85
84

Section 5 is also a jurisdictional vehicle for FTC action against violations
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
85

See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 3287 (1938) ("... under this section the
Commission may stop false advertising with reference to all products. They have

36

Hovenkamp, EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

Even if one defines "exclusionary" conduct with an eye only
toward injunction, most conduct that is "unfair" under state tort law or
FTCA '5 fails to be "exclusionary" under Sherman Act '2. The FTC
Act was clearly conceived as a supplement to the Sherman Act, a
vehicle for evolving, through administrative expertness, prohibitions
of conduct thought contrary to important consumer interests in
honesty and fair dealing quite aside from monopoly. There is no
private right of action for violations of the FTC Act, and the act is not
part of the "antitrust laws" for violation of which private parties may
sue and recover treble damages.
Thus automatically identifying practices "unfair" under the
FTC Act or business tort law as "exclusionary" under '2 is not
consistent with the statutory scheme. The Sherman Act was deemed
a vehicle for incorporating common law notions of restraint of trade,
but certainly not the whole common law of business torts. The
concern of '2 is with monopoly, not unfairness or deception.
Accordingly, it is not enough under '2 to find that a firm has engaged
in "unfair" conduct; the antitrust tribunal must also decide that the
conduct has had, or is likely to have, the effect of significantly
impairing the ability of rivals to compete.
The first and perhaps most important difference between the
common law of business torts and the Federal Trade Commission
Act's coverage of unfair and deceptive acts is the lack of any
requirement of market power or competitive effects. Most of the law
in this category focuses exclusively on conduct, and thus no inquiry
is made whether the conduct is reasonably calculated to create or
preserve a monopoly, or indeed, if monopoly is even plausible in the
market under scrutiny.

always used that power; but in the past they have had to show that the false
advertisement was injurious to some competitor. We are doing away with that
requirement in this bill and are providing that if an advertisement is false and
deceptive it may be stopped if it is injurious to the public.") (Mr. Wheeler). See
also Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941) ("The
failure to mention competition in the latter phrase ["unfair or deceptive acts or
practices"] shows a legislative intent to remove" the requirement of injury to
competition, and "the Commission can now center its attention on the direct
protection of the consumer where formerly it could protect him only indirectly
through the protection of the competitor.").
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Of course, in the presence of substantial market power, some
kinds of tortious behavior could anticompetitively create or sustain a
monopoly, and it would then warrant condemnation under '2. 86 As a
result, it is wrong categorically to condemn such practices under '2
or categorically to excuse them. But the important point is that the
law of business torts or unfair practices was developed without
regard to its tendency to create a monopoly, and there is little more
than an accidental overlap between the kinds of practices thought to
be unfair or tortious and the kind that can support a '2 offense.
Thus many if not most misrepresentations or other practices
held actionable in tort or under '5 do not qualify as anticompetitive or
exclusionary for '2 purposes, even when done by a dominant firm. In
many instances, few buyers are misled. The FTC is entitled to insist
"upon a form of advertising clear enough so that . . . 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein.' " 87 In other instances, the effects
are transitory, either because the misrepresentation was episodic or
because buyers quickly learn the truth. For example, much of the
law of business torts or misrepresentation is targeted at the firm that
comes quickly into business, makes numerous sales on the basis of
false claims, and then disappears or becomes judgment proof before
consumers can obtain redress. That government intervention in
such cases is appropriate can be deemed beyond controversy, but
the relief to be given would not be relief from any real or threatened
monopoly.
In other cases, such as those requiring disclosure of facts
wholly unrelated to product qualities, antitrust might well view the
order rather than the conduct to be "anticompetitive." 88 And proof of
compensable injury to particular buyers for misleading
representations does not necessarily establish significant damage to
competing sellers, whose conduct may, for example, have been no
more exemplary.
86

See Ch. 7E.
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GM v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).

88

For example, Mohawk Refining Co. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3rd Cir. 1959)
(not only prohibiting petitioner from failing to disclose that its oil was reclaimed
from previously used oil, but also from selling such oil at all, notwithstanding a
finding that the product was "identical with all other finished motor oils as to
composition, quality, and utility.").
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Thus, while tort or FTC law provides some learning and
experience that can be used by antitrust courts in identifying
undesirable practices that may properly be deemed "exclusionary,"
the mere fact that the practices are undesirable in this sense is not
enough. 89
Relationship to Other Antitrust Offenses
It is accepted law that a monopolist violates the Sherman Act
if it "has acquired or maintained . . . monopoly . . . by means of those
restraints of trade which are cognizable under '1 [of the Sherman
Act]." 90 But this does not mean that all violations of '1 necessarily
establish the "monopolizing" offense under '2. The monopoly must
be acquired or maintained "by means of" the conduct proscribed
under '1, and not all violations of '1 have the requisite causal effect.
Take, for example, a case in which a monopolist has imposed
minimum resale price maintenance agreements on its distributors.
Such agreements were traditionally per se unlawful under '1, but
they do not create or enhance the monopolist's market power by
curtailing the opportunities of its actual or potential competitors. 91 If
anything, the higher retail prices on the monopolist's goods enhance
their opportunities.
89

An additional problem with incorporating state business tort law is that it
varies, and sometimes widely, from state to state. It would be unseemly for an
antitrust court to seek and then apply the law of the state most hostile to a
particular practice. Even if the injury were confined to states accounting for a
significant portion of the monopolist's business, diversity would in all likelihood
remain; and even if not, it makes no sense to treat two monopolists differently
under '2 because of fortuitous differences in state tort law. In short, antitrust courts
would at the least have to formulate a "federal" law of business torts. But rather
than engage in such an exercise, it seems far more sensible to deal directly with
the question of what is "exclusionary" in light of the purposes of '2.
90

Griffith, note 42 at 106.

91

See generally Ch. 16B. The per se rule against resale price maintenance
was overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). It is conceivable that the high
retail margin protected by minimum resale price agreements would lead retailers to
prefer handling the monopolist's product to that of any newcomer who would
thereby fail to obtain adequate retail representation. But this would be a rare case.
Our point is that a Sherman Act '1 violation is not automatically or necessarily an
"exclusionary" act for '2 purposes.
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Similar caution must be taken with violations of the Clayton
Act: price discrimination, 92 exclusive dealing 93 and tying
arrangements, 94 and acquisitions 95 , in violation of ''2, 3, and 7
respectively. A monopolist from whom large buyers have coerced
discriminatorily low prices has not by such price discrimination
augmented its monopoly power; rather, the discrimination reflects a
weakening of its power. A tying arrangement does not usually
increase monopoly power in the tying-product market, and one that
affects a small percentage of sales of the tied product does not
significantly impair the opportunities of rivals in that market. 96
In sum, whether or not violations of other antitrust provisions
also constitute monopolizing conduct depends on the factual and
analytical reasons behind those other proscriptions. They must be
assessed in terms of '2 purposes. The other side of the coin is that
practices that harm rivals unnecessarily may be violations of '2
when committed by a dominant firm, even though they would not be
violations of other provisions when no dominant firm is involved. For
example, forced bundling by the monopolist can violate '2 even
when the "separate product" requirement that tying law imposes on
nonmonopolists is not present. 97 The monopolist's refusal to deal
may be unlawful even when lack of agreement precludes any finding
of a "boycott". 98 Upon a few occasions courts have condemned
price discrimination by a monopolist when the technical requirements
of the Robinson-Patman Act could not have been met. 99
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See 14 Antitrust Law, Ch. 23.
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See 11 Antitrust Law, Ch. 18.
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See 9 & 10 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17.
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See 4-5 Antitrust Law, Chs. 9 - 11.
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See 9 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17B-2.
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See 3B Antitrust Law &777.
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See 3B Antitrust Law, Ch.7D.
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E.g., United Shoe, note 55 at (condemning USM's price discrimination in
lease terms; leases are not reachable by the Robinson-Patman Act, which covers
only sales).
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The point is that '2's highly general proscription of
"monopolistic" practices is not cabined by any specific statutory
formulation, and thus can be both less than or more than the
prohibitions of the other antitrust laws. As noted previously, this
gives the courts more flexibility to fashion legal doctrine respecting
dominant firms; but it also makes the statute more difficult to apply,
particularly to novel conduct.
Power Essential
The definition of anticompetitive conduct by the dominant firm
must be flexible and not too categorical. Defining exclusionary
conduct as conduct that harms rivals unnecessarily can dispense
with technical requirements that are essential in the law of pricefixing, tying or exclusive dealing, or other practices. Such an
approach is appropriate, for anticompetitive strategic behavior by
dominant firms comes in many kinds, many of which may not be
known or even anticipated today.
But defining monopoly conduct in a flexible manner places a
premium on unambiguous establishment of substantial and durable
power. If courts find monopoly power too readily, they may be
correspondingly unwilling to condemn exclusionary practices that are
anticompetitive when practiced by a true monopolist, but ambiguous
or harmless when the defendant is not a monopolist. These rules
will then be applied to true monopolists as well. Worse yet, courts
may condemn practices that are harmless or even beneficial when
practiced by non-monopolists.
As a court's confidence increases that the defendant before it
is a true and durable monopolist, it can also more confidently
condemn practices that harm rivals unnecessarily. As a result,
"monopoly power" should be found only after rigorous application of
the fundamental principles of market definition and market power
measurement. When courts find substantial market power merely
because a firm's customers are "locked in" to its aftermarket parts or
service; 100 or where the defendant's franchise contract prevents the
buyer from substituting another's goods, 101 then they are no longer
100

E.g., Kodak, note 64, and &564.
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See 2B Antitrust Law &519.
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dealing with the kind of substantial market power that should be the
concern of '2.
Conclusion
To summarize:
$

Assuming that monopoly power has been established,
the unlawful exclusionary conduct that '2 requires
consists of acts that (1) are reasonably capable of
creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either
(2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that
the acts produce, or (2c) produce harms
disproportionate to the resulting benefits.

$

The behavioral component is not defined by "purpose,"
"intent," or similar language. It can be rationally defined
only in terms of conduct. However, knowledge of intent
may sometimes aid in the interpretation of ambiguous
conduct.

$

Proof of actual consumer harm is generally
unnecessary, but the challenged conduct must be of a
type that the anticipated end result is actual consumer
harm. Of course, the private plaintiff must prove the
requisite actual or threatened harm to itself.

$

The given definition of monopolizing conduct is flexible
and frees the court of doctrinal rigidity, but it requires
an extremely careful determination that the defendant
has substantial market power.

